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Chapter 11
Communal Feeding in War Time:
British Restaurants, 1940-1947
Peter J. Atkins
Introduction
When asked to comment on the London County Council's (LCC) plans for a history
of wartime efforts to feed the capital's blitzed population, one insider commented
that 'the story is worth telling .. we are recording an epic in history'. 1 Although
this history was unfortunately never published, for subsequent generations food
has always played an important part in imagining the experience of the nation at
war.? Much of the literature has focused upon the supply chain ('dig for victory',
'the national farm', import shortages) or rationing and its impact upon diet and
nutrition. This leaves a gap for the present paper in the area ofcommunal feeding.
I will look at the curious and somewhat misunderstood institution of the British
Restaurant (BR), which operated from 1941 to 1947 and arguably achieved
notoriety far beyond its numerical significance. In 1942 one commentator
perceptively observed that BRs 'may be said to have started as an improvisation
and to continue as a compromise'.3 The implication of this statement is ofa lack of
strategic foresight, yet there were some positive outcomes that are worth looking
at, and also some unintended consequences.
This chapter is divided into four parts. First, the origins and development of
BRs are analysed, particularly with regard to the rhetoric and hidden purposes
of the Ministry of Food (MF) and of political interests generally. Second, I will
briefly introduce a regional perspective, which, as far as I am aware, has not been
attempted before. Third, I will show that pulling together for the war effort was
not a feature of the catering sector, where vitriolic criticism was made of the
government's communal feeding policies. Fourth, there is consideration of the
food served in BRs.
The historiography ofBRs is interesting in its own right. R.I. Hammond in his
official three volume history of wartime food control devotes a whole chapter to
I London Metropolitan Archives (LMA), LCC/RC/GEN/lIl: E.A. Hartill, 13 January
1944.
2 Although the LCC history remained in draft, the official war history did provide
three volumes on food, authored by R.J. Hammond.
3 Anon. 1942: 675.
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the restaurants and this remains the most detailed account. Hammond's approach
shows a welcome irreverence towards the decision-making process ofgovernment
and reveals tensions and rivalries within and between ministries. There is a degree
of what one might call 'creative chaos under fire' in his narrative, especially in
the early years when air raids threatened to cause widespread dislocation. Writing
in the 1950s, Hammond presumably had access to the relevant civil servants and
their 'inside stories', and certainly some of his interpretations go well beyond the
evidence that has survived in the papers ofthe ME Since Hammond there has been
little of a critical nature written about BRs, although we have a contextualized
commentary by Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska and, more recently, a book by James
Vernon that touches on communal feeding."
Origins and Development
According to the official war history, early plans for emergency feeding were
inchoate. The idea of reviving the National Kitchens that had figured in the First
World War was soon dropped. There appears to have been some bickering between
ministries about who should take on the responsibility of feeding in the event of
enemy attacks. In the spring of 1940 the advent of Lord Woolton as Minister of
Food, and then Churchill as Prime Minister, was something ofa turning point. By
July an experiment was being conducted by the MF on a working-class housing
estate in North Kensington.' Over 2,000 hot meals per week were cooked on simple
ranges, the choice being limited to popular dishes such as Irish stew and dumplings,
or roast beef. A different main meal was cooked each day at an affordable price by
volunteer labour. People's reactions seem to have been largely positive, although
timeliness was identified as a key issue because workers and school children all
needed to eat quickly in the short lunch period available to them. The ministry was
sufficiently encouraged by this project to envisage the scaling up of catering to
meet local needs in what were to be called Community Feeding Centres.
In early September Woolton requested that the LCC should take the lead in
providing communal feeding facilities in the capital." The departure point was
the need to help people unable to prepare meals for themselves due to temporary
interruptions of gas, water and electricity services because of bombing." These
emergency facilities were important, in the words of Richard Titmuss, for
4 Zweiniger-Bargielowska 2000, Vernon2007.
5 Gates 1942: 102, The National Archives, Kew (TNA), MAF 99/1797, 'Ministry of
Food, the Communal Restaurant: an Experiment', October 1940.
6 The first approach was on 10 September, just after the first major air raids, with the
formal letter following a week later. The Minister guaranteed that the Council would not be
out of pocket as a result ofthis policy, LMA, LCC/RC/GEN/1/l.
7 London County Council, Civil Defence and General Purposes Committee, 'The
Londoners' Meals Service', 21 October 1940.
I'
1
absorbing the shock of air raids." Called the Londoners' Meals Service (LMS),
this was always separate from the BRs scheme. But in effect the two were similar,
at least in post-blitz London, which was dominated by field kitchens and mobile
canteens offering a 'cash and carry' service. The first indoor dining room was
opened in Woolmore Street, Poplar on 24 October 1940.9 By Christmas, 139 LMS
centres were producing a total of 80,000 meals a week. Many of the sites were
schools, first because the buildings were increasingly available as children were
evacuated, and, second, because the domestic science teachers and their facilities
would otherwise have been unemployed and underutilized. The pricing formula
was'cost of food + 25 per cent + Yzd for fuel', working out at an affordable 9d or
10d for a two-course meal.
In November 1940 provincial local authorities were circulated, asking them
to consider setting up what were now to be called Community Kitchens.'? By the
end of the year these had been established in major cities such as Birmingham,
Bradford, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester and Newcastle upon Tyne. Progress was
slow at first but the spread of air raids concentrated the minds of councils, as did
the minister's offer of financial assistance."
Churchill disliked terminology such as 'Communal Feeding Centre' and
'Community Kitchen' as redolent' of Communism and the workhouse'. In March
1941 he suggested the name 'British Restaurant' because the word 'restaurant'
is associated positively in people's minds with 'a good meal'." One modem
branding professional sees this in retrospect as the masterstroke of someone who
instinctively understood the difference between product and brand. 13
The process of setting up BRs was fairly bureaucratic." At first the ministry
insisted on approving all applications from the centre and the paperwork often
took months, involving the allocation ofequipment, 15 requisition of buildings and
recruitment of staff." To short-cut this process, some local authorities decided
to open their own communal restaurants, as did voluntary organizations such as
8 Titmuss 1950: 346.
9 LMA, LCC/RC/GEN/1/1, 'LCC, Meals Services, Origin of the Service, [1944]'.
10 TNA, MAF 83/382, MAF 99/1796.
11 TNA, MAF 74/49, Ministry of Food, Public Relations Division, Information
Branch, 'British Restaurants', 3 September 1943.
12 Memo to Minister of Food, 21 March 1941, Churchill 1950: 663.
13 Bernstein 2003: 1137-8.
14 Some sample documents have been preserved for Barrow-in-Furness and other
places, see TNA, MAF 99/1684-6.
15 Equipment was scheduled under 150 different headings, including solid fuel
ranges, as well as electric and gas cookers; potato peeling machines; electric washing
machines; refrigerators and insulated containers; sinks, scales, saucepans and furniture,
TNA, MAF 74/49.
16 From May, 1941, Divisional Food Officers were given this power.
the National Council of Social Service and the Women's Voluntary Services.'?
The advantage of being inside the official system was that all capital costs were
reimbursed. The disadvantage was that ministry officials continued to micro-
manage, such as suggesting menus, monitoring food quality and insisting on each
outlet being financially self-supporting. 18
Most BRs were run on the cafeteria principle." The diners bought tickets and
then queued up and chose food from a series ofhot plates. From May 1941 onwards
a number ofcooking depots were set up around the country in order to supply food
in bulk to the BRs and schools in that locality. My estimate is that about 10 per
cent of BR meals were supplied in this way and, surprisingly perhaps, the quality
was said to have been indistinguishable from the meals prepared on site."
BRs received allowances for rationed foods on the same scale as commercial
catering establishments, although the quantities were higher where at least 60
per cent of the clientele were industrial workers, especially for those in Category
B - heavy manual labour (Table 11.1).21 BRs were just one element of a broad
government wartime food policy, which can be divided into the systematic
(rationing, welfare foods, milk in schools) and the practical. The latter included
provisions for day-to-day feeding (BRs, school canteens, factory and pithead
canteens, and a rural pie scheme) and emergency feeding (cooking depots,
emergency meals centres, rest centres, air raid shelter canteens, Queen's Messenger
Convoys, and other mobile canteens)." This system was administered by three
ministries, namely Food, Education and Labour.
As a result of this complexity, the term 'British Restaurant' was confusingly
vague. We have already mentioned the dining rooms set up under the MF's scheme.
These were supplemented by the LCC's LMS, by other local authority schemes
and by restaurants set up by voluntary organizations. All ofthese counted in official
statistics as BRs but they often had no direct connexion with the government.
In addition, evacuee feeding centres were sometimes rebranded as BRs, as were
school canteens that served meals on a daily basis to the general public."
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Table 11.1 Catering Allowances per Main Meal, 1943
Allowancesfor industrial workers
Food Normal caterers Category A Category B
Bacon(oz.) 0.14 0.14 0.14
Fats (oz.) 0.30 0.50 0.50
Sugar(oz.) 0.12 0.12 0.20
Meat (oz.) 1.00 1.50 2.00
Fish (oz.) 0.32 0.32 0.32
Cheese(oz.) 0.21 0.21 0.21
Preserves (oz.) 0.14 0.14 0.14
Driedegg (oz.) 0.16 0.16 0.16
Liquidmilk (pts)
Skimmilk powder 0.12 0.12 0.12
Sausage meat (oz.) 0.67 0.67 0.67
Suet (oz.) 0.08 0.08
Source: TNA,MAF 256/197.
Rhetoric and Purpose
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17 For instance Bournemouth, Eastboume, Hastings, Hull, Newcastle, Oxford and
Wolverhampton.
18 Foodqualitywas a sensitive issue.Woolton was anxiousfor his staffto remember
'the Ministry's prestige was very closely associated with the efficiency of British
Restaurants [and] he was anxious that the quality of the service and other meals served
should be maintained at a higher level', TNA, MAF 99/1716, memo by Mr Harwood, 27
October1941.
19 TNA,MAF 74/49.
20 TNA, MAF 99/1734, City of Birmingham, Reconstruction Committee, 'British
Restaurant Enquiry, September II to October6, 1944'.
21 Pyke 1944b: 231,TNA,MAF 74/49.
22 Jones 1944: 121--40, Ministryof Food 1946: 43-5.
23 Thesewere the result of deals done with the Ministryof Health and the Board of
Education, TNA,MAF 74/49.
Why did the government favour BRs? Apparently, the MF had envisaged 10,000
restaurants spread around the country, but it achieved only 1,500 under their own
scheme, and a peak of 2,160 overall." Essentially public rhetoric and private
memoranda employed two types of argument. First, there was a cluster that we
might call functionalist or utilitarian justifications. There were suggestions, for
instance, that BRs served the war effort by improving efficiency in one way or
another. In 1941 their purpose was said to be principally:
Toensurethat peoplewho, owingto war conditions, have difficulty in securing
meals, shallbe able to havea leastone hot nutritious meal a day at a reasonable
24 The Ministrybeganpressurizing local authorities in 1940but this ceasedin 1943,
TNA,MAF99/1759.
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price. Such people include those whose incomes have fallen, old age pensioners,
and others with small fixed incomes, women engaged in war work, men whose
wives and families have evacuated, and evacuated persons who have difficulties
owing to limited domestic accommodation. School children are also catered for in
a number of restaurants and this service is likely to expand very considerably."
A possible reading of this statement is that BRs were a form of infilling where
factory canteens were not provided, for instance in industrial districts dominated
by workshops, and where local education authorities were not supplying school
dinners.
Related to this was an economy of scale argument. Resources of various kinds
were ofcourse in short supply in wartime and BRs were said to economise on fuel
to cook meals and labour to prepare and serve them." Hidden beneath was the
point that, where communal facilities were available within easy walking distance,
it became difficult for housewives to resist the call to work on the grounds that
their domestic labour was irreplaceable. Nutrition was also frequently cited as
a justification for government-sanctioned feeding schemes. Dieticians were used
in formulating menus and the ministry deployed scientific expertise to analyse
the content of meals. BRs were therefore a small cog in the larger engine of food
policy that strove to improve health and working efficiency.
Second, the political case for BRs was partly ideological and partly tied to
wartime strategy. The first element was the subject of an unseen struggle in the
wartime coalition government between Conservatives, such as Woolton, and those
on the left. The latter constantly stressed that 'the restaurants are used mainly
by the working classes and the lower paid professional and clerical classes'.27
Ernest Bevin, the Minister of Labour, frequently demanded an expansion of
industrial canteens," whereas Woolton maintained that 'there is ... no restriction
in admittance to British restaurants; they are open to all members of the public'."
Woolton's justification for this was that BRs were intended for those involved in
war work, and that this was not restricted to fighting or making munitions. They
should therefore equally be open to shop assistants, office workers and housewives.
Others, from the right, saw communal feeding as 'entirely abhorrent to the British
25 TNA, MAF 9911589, Ministry of Food, 'Memorandum on British Restaurants',
[1941].
26 TNA, MAF 74/49, Ministry of Food, Public Relations Division, Information
Branch, 'British Restaurants', 3 September 1943.
27 TNA, MAF 99/1590-94, monthly reports on British Restaurants to the War
Cabinet.
28 Hammond 1956: 390.
29 TNA, MAF 99/1589, Ministry of Food, 'Memorandum on British Restaurants',
[1941].
way oflife' and this divide was later to be a live political issue when the war ended
but BRs continued.3D
A decision was made early on in the war not to close down commercial
restaurants or to charge the food they served against people's rations." Following
on from this there was the oft heard accusation of waste and 'luxury feeding'
in expensive restaurants. In a sense, BRs were a balancing measure, giving
equivalent access, off the ration, to people who would otherwise have been unable
to afford to eat out. There was a deliberate policy to make eating in a BR an
uplifting experience. The decor was lightened and even details such as the font of
the lettering on notices were discussed. A few restaurants had live music and many
had art, either newly painted murals or specially chosen prints. In short, here was
a vehicle for raising morale. BR customers, according to a survey in Birmingham,
seem to have appreciated the food, the service, and the 'homely' atmosphere.V
London and the Regions
In 1942 most local authorities with populations over 50,000 (mostly County and
Municipal Boroughs) had adopted the BR idea. In the band 10,000 to 50,000 it
was about a half, and a quarter for those authorities under 10,000.33 Twelve local
authorities had ten or more restaurants open each, and London dominated with
a quarter to a third of BRs nationally." Table 11.2 shows regional variations at
the scale of the Food Office District. For the sake of comparison, some data is
included on commercial catering premises from a census by the MF in 1940.
Although it was anticipated that the enemy would bomb vital installations and
maybe civilian targets, plans to deal with the consequences were slow to recognize
the need to feed displaced populations. Communal feeding in various guises was
encouraged but the MF throughout the war avoided centralized compulsion.
Instead they relied upon persuading local authorities to take responsibility for the
particular circumstances of their area. This amounted to a redefinition of the role
of the local state.
30 Ernest Burdett in Morgan et al. 1946: 515.
31 Woolton 1959: 220. This was different from the decision made in Germany to
deduct cafe meals from ration quotas, Anderson 1943: 27.
32 TNA, MAF 99/1734, A 1944 survey of the British Restaurants in Birmingham
found that the vast majority of the 1530 people questioned were favourably disposed.
33 TNA, MAF 152/55.
34 TNA, MAF 74/49.
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Table 11.2 The Regional Pattern of British Restaurants and Civic
Restaurants
Population Population Numbers of British Civic
per catering per British Restaurants Restaurants,
establishment, Restaurant, 1948
1940 1941
1941 1943
England
Eastern I 308 14,659 37 56 22
Eastern II 228 16,061 45 83 25
London 237 13,736 364 501 212
Midlands 251 79,329 34 138 127
North 308 16,927 67 131 42
Midlands
North 493 16,432 74 185 31
North East 334 23,335 105 176 64
North West 275 57,832 74 166 77
South 238 19,708 71 197 48
South East 185 8,794 127 112 42
South West 229 16,429 67 108 38
Wales
North 171 160,000 1 8 4
South 336 22,932 33 84 15
Scotland
East 331 36,000 5 16 2
North 278 0 1 1
North East 407 0 6 0
South East 380 30,000 15 21 6
West 537 231,425 8 46 17
N. Ireland 427 34,615 13 14 0
UK 280 20,910 1140 2043 773
Sources: TNA, MAF 74/49; MAF 83/382; MAF 99/519; MAF 99/1589.
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Government had previously been concerned with such matters as education,
public assistance, parks and playgrounds, and utilities. But more vital matters,
such as air raid precautions, life in shelters, the evacuation of children, or the
operation of British Restaurants, required a greater understanding of the way of
life ofthe people, their habits and desires, their hopes and fears. The relationship
of the local official to the community as a whole in the pre-war period was
an important one, but it was generally related to matters that were impersonal
to most of the community. The emphasis has now changed to matters of vital
personal concern for citizens. 35
Initially there was some irritation in the Ministry at the attitude of some local
authorities. Despite the inducements offered in the form ofcapital grants, guarantees
against operating losses and professional advice on practical details, 'the vast
majority' of councils by early 1941 had not welcomed the idea." The reaction was
said to have 'varied from true passive resistance to lukewarm acquiescence ... The
general retort to any approach ... has been that a demand ... does not exist in that
particular town. '37 Town clerks apparently 'seized on any pretext for delay' and were
especially exercised by the lack of a clear legal framework for action, for instance
in the requisitioning ofpremises. This excuse disappeared on 28 January 1941 with
the making ofthe Local Authorities (Community Kitchens) Order under Regulation
54B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939. Nevertheless the government's
non-aggressive policy was restated in a circular letter the following month:
The Minister ofFood does not wish to cause local authorities to set up Community
Kitchens when the need does not exist, the intention ofthe Order is solely to give
adequate authority for the establishment ofCommunity Kitchens where there is
need for them."
In view of the resistance and apathy in some areas, it is not at all surprising that
there was a great deal of geographical variation in implementation. Local politics
in Manchester, for instance, were said never to have been favourable to BR.39 When
pressed the city authorities preferred to open outlets in the suburbs rather than in
the city centre." By contrast, Liverpool, Birmingham and Bristol bought into the
concept at an early date and made substantial local provision. Even London had
35 Biddle 1942: 83.
36 French 1943, Q.2855, made it clear that the Ministry considered the route ofdirect
control: 'after all, we are a very large trading organization'.
37 TNA, MAF 99/1589, Ministry of Food, 'Memorandum on the Position of
Community Feeding', January 1941.
38 TNA, MAF 99/1609.
39 Daily Telegraph, 29 December 1944.
40 TNA, MAF 99/1759, Memorandum, 'Establishment of British Restaurants',
[1942].
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great diversity. The boroughs varied in their initiative and enthusiasm to the extent
that Chelsea and Poplar had one restaurant per 8,000 people, whereas Stepney
had one per 70,000.41 Ellen Leopold attributes this at least partly to civil defence
planning which encouraged the oversupply of facilities in west London for the
benefit of evacuees who would have gone there from the south coast in the event
of an invasion." Towns responded differently to the BR idea. Many were happy
with a pared down version that meant trestle tables and benches, while for others
the presentation ofwhat they saw as a 'social service' was at the core oftheir civic
pride. An example is the degree to which the price of meals (mostly lunch) were
subsidized. In 1944, for instance, the vast majority were charged at 8d or 9d, but a
quarter of authorities opted for less and some insisted on as much as Is.43
Commercial Resistance to Civic Entrepreneurship
One explanation for geographical variations was the power of chambers of
commerce in many localities. On behalfofthe catering trade, the chambers opposed
central interference in the free market under the cover of war measures. Private
caterers objected that they could not produce a meal equivalent to that in BRs at a
comparable price. A confidential estimate by the MF in 1946 was that a standard
cafeteria meal costing Is 3d in a BR was at least Is 10d in a Lyons outlet."
The official war history reveals the advantages enjoyed by BRs.45 They benefited
in effect from interest-free loans and the guaranteed write-off of any operating
losses that were not too excessive. Their equipment was purchased centrally. They
received professional advice on sites, equipment and food standards from ministry
officials. To some extent this was balanced by the fact that many were in unsuitable
premises, serving restricted menus, and with costs inflated by the payment ofwages
approved by the Joint Industrial Council that were above the catering industry
norm. Direct comparisons with the private sector are therefore difficult. On 12
January 1942 Woolton met with a deputation from the catering trade. He promised
to look at representations about proposals for any new restaurants that were said to
be unnecessary in view ofexisting commercial provision. This was repeated in an
answer to a parliamentary question two weeks later,"
Profitability was variable. In the financial year 1942-3, after allowing for the
amortization of capital, 698 local authorities running BRs achieved a net profit
and this was repeated in 1943--4.47 After the war, Gilbert Sugden found that
41 LMA, LCC/RC/GEN/1/26.
42 Leopold 1989: 208.
43 TNA, MAF 99/1797.
44 TNA, MAF 99/137, 'Brief for the Minister', 21 May 1946.
45 Hammond 1956: 397-8.
46 Hansard 377,28 January 1942, c. 717.
47 TNA, MAF 99/1609.
civic restaurants were still mostly profitable in 1947-8, although some care is
needed with his conclusions because authorities running loss-making portfolios of
restaurants were forced to close them down." This happened most famously to the
LCC, whose costs soared, particularly due to rising rents in the city centre.
Opinions about alternatives were explored in the wartime social survey. In
February 1943 a stratified sample of 4490 industrial workers found that 42 per
cent had lunch at home, 22 used a canteen, 19 per cent ate sandwiches, and 11
per cent frequented cafes." A 1944 survey ofBR customers in Birmingham found
that 62.6 per cent of respondents saw going home as their main option, and 11.2
per cent would have eaten sandwiches. Only 3.8 per cent considered a private
restaurant or cafe." Convenience seems to have been a major factor since over
half of customers travelled five minutes or less for their meal and 91 per cent for
15 minutes or less. Clearly this would not have been possible in cities with fewer
outlets than Birmingham." One argument in favour of BRs was that they had
played their part in the enormous increase during the war ofeating out. On balance
it was therefore likely that they had helped to increase trade for catering generally
rather than competing with the private sector.52
The Food in British Restaurants
The MF from the outset thought carefully about the nutritional standard of meals
served at BRs. In March, 1941, ministry dieticians prepared sets of menus, taking
into account regional preferences, such as in Scotland." The same year a booklet
entitled Canteen Catering was issued. It listed standard and special recipes, with
suggestions for alternatives where supplies were short or variable.
Generally speaking, the food in BRs was said to be ofgood quality and filling.54
There were some attempts to introduce meals in the Oslo style, with the intention
of providing in one sitting all of the day's needs for animal protein, vitamins
and minerals.55 But this met with resistance from customers who wanted their
48 Sugden 1949.
49 Box and Thomas 1944: 162.
50 These data are at odds with a London survey in 1943, where the percentages were
24,27, and 18 respectively. No doubt the longer commuting distances in the big city will
have been a factor. London Council of Social Service 1943: 17.
51 TNA, MAF 99/1734, City of Birmingham, Reconstruction Committee, 'British
Restaurant Enquiry, September 11 to October 6, 1944'.
52 TNA, MAF 99/1734, National Council of Social Service, Report of the Conference,
'The Future of Communal Restaurants', 7 February 1944.
53 TNA, MAF 74/49.
54 They were said to be superior to those served in the restaurants of the Sorbonne, in
Paris, The Times, 22 February 1947,6.
55 Pyke 1944a: 92.
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Table 11.3 The Nutritional Content of British Restaurant Meals in
February 1943
traditional meat and two vegetables.56 In Birmingham all 56 BRs had a choice of
five meat dishes, five vegetables and five desserts, and those in the city centre had
more. In other cities with less on offer, menus had to be removed from the entrances
because customers would 'wander from one to another and the restaurant serving
roast attracted the customer'.57
A meeting was held in June 1942 to request the collaboration of universities
and research institutes around the country. 58 In the chair, Dr Magnus Pyke, of the
MF's Scientific Adviser's Division, suggested a start with work on the vitamin C
content of canteen meals. This was because restrictions on fruit intake transferred
the onus of delivering vitamin C on to vegetables, and especially cabbage.
There was concern that mass catering, particularly the use of hot cupboards, was
destructive of this vitamin, so the research results were eagerly anticipated. It had
initially been planned that a main meal in a BR would provide one third of the
day's energy needs." In practice, the survey found (Table 11.3) about 22 per cent
of recommended calories in an average BR lunch. This was partly because the
use of potatoes as a substitute for bread gave meals a bulky and unappetizing
appearance. Vitamin C was low in winter/"
Energy
Protein
Calcium
Iron
Vitamin A
Vitamin B,
VitaminC
Riboflavin
Nicotinicacid
Source: TNA,MAF 256/197.
Standard
1000 k cals
24g.
270 mg.
8 mg.
200 i.u.
200 i.u.
50 mg.
0.9 mg.
12 mg.
Actual
626 k cals
22 g.
186 mg.
4-9 mg.
1000 i.u.
136 i.u.
28--49 mg. (seasonal)
0.3-0.9 mg.
7mg
Conclusion
An occasional trope in the confidential papers of the MF was of sympathy for
the plight of women and the promotion of BRs and other forms of communal
feeding as means of easing the burden of domesticity. But feminist research,
while acknowledging women's vital role in wartime industry, rejects institutions
such as communal feeding as ofany long-term significance. Their facilitating role
was minimal since the expectation upon working women was now of a double
burden that included a return to all of the pre-war commitment to cooking and
child care."
What then of the other achievements of the MF's BR policy? The functional
arguments that I referred to above were modest in their outcome. The best we can
say is that at the height of the war about half a million people a day (including
children) received a cheap but nutritious meal that supplemented their rations.
This filled a small niche in industrial feeding, particularly in the workshop cities
such as Birmingham, but maybe less so in factory cities such as Manchester, where
works canteens bore the burden.
Three methods of quantifying this impact were used at the time. The first, as
used by the MF, was to look at the allocation of rationed foodstuffs such as meat,
as a surrogate measure." On this basis it was calculated that, in August 1941,
BRs received 3.7 per cent of the catering total. Second, various estimates were
made of the number of meals served. Again in 1941, BRs were calculated to have
managed only 0.9 per cent of total, with commercial restaurants at 38.3 per cent,
and industrial canteens at 14.5 per cent. 63 A 1942 version of the latter, given in a
parliamentary answer, revealed somewhat different figures at 1.8,57.1, and 41.0
per cent respectively." And a retrospective enquiry at the end of the war found
that BRs were providing 3.5 per cent of main meals in January 1942, rising to 7.5
per cent by March 1944.65 The third approach was to ask the consumers where
they ate. The wartime social survey in February 1943 found that only 2 per cent
ate in BRs.66This is probably the most reliable figure. The instability in the data
above is due to the definition of a 'meal', which on some occasions included tea
or snacks, but on others was restricted to cooked main meals. Overall, we can say
with confidence that BRs contributed only marginally to wartime feeding.
The more intangible political considerations are a little more positive. Most
importantly perhaps, BRs contributed to a debate about communal feeding that
continued after the war, but which ultimately ran into the sand at the mid-1950s
56 The Times, 2 July 1942,2.
57 LMA,LCC/RC/GEN/l/I, memo by M.e. Broatch,3 September 1943.
58 TNA,MAF 83/382, MAF98/61.
59 TNA, MAF 256/197, 'The Nutritive Value of Communal Meals', 15 February
1943.
60 Boothet al. 1942.
61 Summerfield 1983, Jackson 1992: 160.
62 Each main meal in the catering sector was allocated Id worth of meat and, in
calculating total consumption, the rationfor domestic consumption couldbe added.
63 TNA,MAF 83/382, Committee on CateringEstablishments.
64 Hansard 383, 22 October1942, c. 2121.
65 TNA,MAF 99/1734.
66 Box and Thomas 1944: 162.
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l
political hinge point with the abolition of rationing in 1954 and entrenchment of
Conservative ideals at the 1955 general election.
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